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Professor RUBIN called for the use of the tools of the law in other contexts.
He suggested questioning the credentials in the U.N. General Assembly of
the Soviet military occupation regime's Afghan representatives; without
questioning the existence of Afghanistan as a state, the group purporting to
be its government certainly looked more like a foreign military occupation
regime. And surely the acts of the Soviet military forces in Afghanistan could
properly be measured against the prescriptions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions even if the armed conflict there were not of international character.
He deplored the Administration's apparent ignoring of the tools of international law and the current emphasis on domestic politics in other contexts,
citing the imposition of draft registration as a futile and divisive "signal" to
be sending abroad. He expressed dismay over the Administration's appeal to
nonexistent presidential authority to withdraw the United States from
participation in the Olympic Games and the failure to explore the legal
organization of the Games and persuade those with real authority of the
wisdom of the President's policy. In this last connection he referred to his own
experience as a qualifier for the American Olympic squad (but not the final
team) in 1956.
ERIK PETERSON*

Reporter

INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR THE APPREHENSION AND
RENDITION OF FUGITIVE OFFENDERS
The panel convened at 4:30 p.m., April 18, 1980, Alona E. Evans"
presiding.
INTRODUCTION BY THE CHAIRMAN

Our topic this afternoon is "International Procedures for the Apprehension
and Rendition of Fugitive Offenders." It may be asked why this topic at this
time. Everybody knows about extradition. Unfortunately, there is much
about extradition which is not generally known to practitioners on the one
hand and to extradition magistrates on the other, not to speak of the general
public. It is a proceeding beset by various problems, both procedural and
substantive. Among the latter, one may single out as a "hot issue" the
question of the definition of the "political offense," a matter of particular
concern to those involved in the extradition of international terrorists. Are
we bound by the CastioniRule, ' the political movement engaged in a political
uprising? Or should we analyze the offense closely, denying it political
character if it was a random act, a private act, an act directed against the
civilian population, or an "act of odious barbarism," to quote the Court of
Appeal of Paris in the recent extradition case of a fugitive charged with
*School Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University.
**Elizabeth Kimball Kendall Professor of Political Science, Wellesley College.
'Re Castioni 118911 1 Q.B. 149.

complicity in the detention and murder of former premier Aldo Moro of
Italy. Extradition is one of our concerns this afternoon, but not the only one. The
term "rendition" is used in the title of our topic in a generic sense, for the
international practice, there are several ways of acquiring custody of fugitive
offenders, some legal, some illegal, some common, some esoteric. These
several methods will first be sketched. Then the panel will examine certain
ones in more detail.
In considering international rendition of fugitive offenders, extradition is
the only lawful method in the international legal system. Thus, it is used in
the formula, "extradite or submit to prosecution," which is central to several
conventions designed to further the development of international criminal
law, such as the conventions proscribing aircraft hijacking, attacks upon
internationally protected persons, or the taking of hostages? Founded upon
long established practice, 4 there is what may be called a customary law of
extradition which is widely followed both in extradition treaties and in
extradition statutes. The typical extradition treaty provides that the accused
must be found in the territory of the requested state, that the offense charged
must be punishable in both the requesting and requested states, that double
jeopardy and prescription must be recognized, that nationals may not be
extradited, that there can be no extradition on political charges, that the
request must be made through the diplomatic channel, that the accused may
only be detained for a limited period pending extradition proceedings, and
that the accused may only be tried in the requesting state on the precise
charge for which he was surrendered. 5 Extradition is usually governed by
treaty although some states will extradite on the basis of statute and comity.6
The United States may extradite only by treaty where it is the requested
state (18 U.S.C. §3181). Where the United States is the requesting state, it
may ask for extradition by comity but without a commitment to reciprocity in
the matter.'
Extradition is a criminal proceeding which is similar to a preliminary
hearing. The accused has his day in court and can raise questions as to
identification, double criminality, and the political character of the charges.
In no sense is the proceeding a trial although there are instances of courts
'Re Piperno, No. 1343-79, Cour d'Appel de Paris, Chambre d'Accusation, l~re Section, Oct. 17,
1979. See also, In the Matter of the Extradition of McMullen, Magistrate No. 3-78-1099 MG
(C.D. Cal. May 11, 1979) (bombing military barracks held incidental to uprising in United
Kingdom); In the Matter of the Extradition of Eain, Magistrate No. 79 M 175 (N.D. I1. Dec. 18,
1979) (bombing market place did not constitute attack upon government); In the Matter of
Budlong and Kember, Nos. 199/79, 200/79, Q.B.D., Nov. 30, 1979 (burglary engineered by
accused did not challenge government).
'Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1641,
T.I.A.S. 7192; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, 1973, T.I.A.S. 8532; International Convention
against the Taking of Hostages, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/34/819 (1979) at 5.
1I. A. SHEARER,EXTRADITION ININTERNATIONAL LAW 5 et seq. (1971).
'E.g., United States-Canada, Treaty on Extradition, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 983, T.I.A.S. 8237;
United State"-France, Extradition Convention, 1909, 37 Stat. 1526, TS 561, 7 BEVANS 872.
'E.g., Fiocconi and Kella v. Attorney General, 462 F. 2d 475 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409
U.S. 1059 (1972) (extradited from Italy by comity as offense not listed in treaty).
'Id. See, 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 737 (1968). See also, United States v.
Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229 (E. D. N. Y. 1976), affd 559 F. 2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1977); see DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1977 443 at 446 (J. A. Boyd, ed. 1979).

which have so regarded it. In the United States, as in many other states, the
proceeding is handled by the courts. Where surrender of an accused has been
recommended, the final decision is that of the Secretary of State who may
withhold surrender for reasons of national policy, humanitarian considerations, or a difference with the court on the interpretation of the treaty. 8
Extradition may be the established method of rendition, but it is by no
means a convenient method or, indeed, a popular method. In a recent study of
231 instances of rendition of persons charged with international terrorist
offenses, it was found that only 6 out of 87 extradition requests were granted;
on the other hand, 145 terrorists were expelled by 28 states.9 Deportation,
using this word to cover both exclusion and explusion of aliens, is a common
method of rendition. How does it differ from extradition? For one thing, it is a
civil proceeding which has as its purpose immigration control. It is handled
by the Executive, with recourse to the courts, if at all, only where administrative remedies have been exhausted. However elaborate the administrative
proceedings of deportation may be, as in the United States, and in some
states they are conspicuous by their absence, these proceedings are not
controlled by the criminal justice standards of extradit.jn which afford
protection to the states involved and to the accused. In U.S. practice, the
courts will give short shrift to the accused who complains that he should not
be tried on criminal charges because he was deported to the United States
instead of being extradited.10 After all, the Ker Rule governs the court's
jurisdiction."
In international practice, then, extradition and deportation are the usual
methods of rendition of fugitive offenders. But there are some other ways of
accomplishing this objective. A military offender, for example, may be
surrendered to a requesting state pursuant to a Status of Forces Agreement
with that state.' 2 Here, there is the formality of a treaty, but the treaty has
not been designed for the purpose of rendition per se. The endorsement of a
passport compelling the holder to return to the issuing state is a rather
esoteric method of rendition which appears to be available where there are
criminal charges pending against the holder. 1 3 And then there are irregular
methods of rendition which may be differentiated only as to whether their
irregularity is overt or covert. Kidnappng or other forceful measures are
E.g., Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F. 2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1062 (1977)
(dictum that extradition may be denied by Executive on humanitarian grounds); Jhirad v.
Ferrandina, 536 F. 2d 478 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 833 (1976) (extradition denied by
Secretary of State in disagreement with court as to statute of limitations) see DIGESr OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONALLAW 1976 114-16 (E. C. McDowell, ed. 1977).
'LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. 494-95 (A. E. Evans and J. F. Murphy, eds.
1978).
-See United States v. Lira, 515 F. 2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 847 (1975) (no
direct U.S. involvement where United States requested deportation from Chile); United States
ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F. 2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 421 U.S. 1001 (1975) (no inquiry
into acts of Bolivian police in deporting accused to United States).
"Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
"E.g., Holmes v. Laird, 459 F. 2d 1211 (D. C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 869 (1972)
(returned to Federal Republic of Germany); United States ex rel Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp.
1261 (W. D. Pa. 1970) (returned to Japan).
"See Agee v. Vance 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980) (comment by court in finding that there
was no congressional authorization for Secretary of State to compel plaintiff to return to United
States on grounds that his activities abroad were detrimental to national security or foreign
policy).

obvious examples. Less obvious is resort to a repatriation program designed
to include (or blackmail) an individual to return to the country from which he
has fled, the very flight itself being a criminal act in some states. Participation by U.S. officials in irregular methods of rendition has been condemned in
United States v. Toscanino. " But pursuing their policy of avoiding inquiries
into governmental operations in foreign countries, courts will rely upon the
Ker Rule despite allegations that an accused is in the United States because
he had been forcibly expelled from a foreign country.
These, then, are the various ways in which international rendition of
fugitive offenders can be accomplished. Our panelists are going to analyze
some of these methods in detail. Mr. Kenney will consider the practical
problems involved in the extradition process. Professor Bassiouni will speculate on whether extradition can be made a more effective method of rendition.
Mr. Gordon will examine the question of whether exclusion and expulsion
should be recognized as lawful methods of rendition, and if so, what
international standards should be developed for their use. Professor Williams
will consider the extent to which irregular methods of rendition are in use
and how their use can be controlled.
REMARKS BY M. CHERfF BASSIOUNI °

These remarks will endeavor to raise a number of questions which have
rendered extradition in the United States a cumbersome practice in need of
new legislation aimed at its reform without curtailing the constitutional and
other human rights of a relator.
One of a number of problems perceived in current extradition practices is
the excessive reliance in many countries, and particularly in the United
States, on bilateral treaties. Yet extradition could be carried out on the basis
of reciprocity or comity if appropriate national legislation to do this existed in
the respective requested and requesting states. While existing U.S. legislation precludes these types of arrangements, there is no constitutional
impediment to a revision of Title 18, Sec. 3180 to provide for extradition on
the basis of reciprocity or comity without a bilateral treaty. Notwithstanding
the requirement of a treaty it is an anomaly in U.S. practice that the United
States does not rely on extradition clauses in multilateral treaties. The
United States is a signatory to a number of multilateral treaties which
provide a basis for extradition covering a number of serious crimes. These
treaties state that signatories will include certain crimes in their bilateral
extradition treaties, and, in the event that they do not, the signatories will
rely on these treaties. The United States has in fact endeavored to include
these crimes in its bilateral treaties (e.g. war crimes under the four Geneva
conventions of August 1949; hijacking under the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal
Conventions of 1963, 1970 and 1971; slavery and related practices under the
"500 F. 2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). On remand, the District Court found that the accused's due
process rights had not been violated. 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Cf. United States v.
Lara, 593 F. 2d 495 (5th Cir. 1976).
*De Paul University College of Law. The author's reliance in this presentation is on the
following works: M. C. BASSIOUNI. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1974);
1. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN I NTERNATIONAL LAW, (1971); M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OFI1NTERNATIONAL
LAW (1968); M. C. BASSIOUNI AND V. P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(1973); LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (A. Evans and J. Murphy, eds. 1979); and
M. C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A DRAFTI NTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE (1980).

1926 and 1956 Conventions and their Amending Protocols; traffic in drugs
under the 1953 Opium Convention; the 1961 Single Convention, its 1972
Amending Protocol, and the 1971 Convention of Psychotropic Substances).
Another problem with respect to U.S. reliance on bilateral treaties arises
in the practice of listing extraditable offenses in each treaty. This raises
numerous problem of interpretation not to speak of the frequent need to
revise treaties to include new crimes.
There are a host of other problems which exist with respect to specific
offenses and treaty interpretation particularly in determining the applicable
jurisprudence. A much better practice would simply be to apply the principle
of double criminality in abstracto, that is, if the offense constitutes a crime
under the laws of both countries it will be considered extraditable providing
it is punishable by no less than one year of imprisonment. This is now the
prevailing trend in the European practice. Such an approach would eliminate
the problems of frequent treaty renegotiations with all that this process
comports of difficulties, and would avoid many judicial delays and reviews
which stem from legal battles over the meaning of a treaty-stated extraditable offense and i'.s interpretation under the law of the state wherein the
relator may be found.
Another problem with current extradition practice arises with regard to
the apprehension of the relator. Under the provisions of a more recent U.S.
extradition treaty there is a clause on provisional arrest. Thus a requesting
state may send an arrest warrant, or even a TELEX, to request the United
States to arrest an offender provisionally for a period of time (between 45 to
60 days) before the arrival of the formal extradition request. Such informal
requests are supposed to provide sufficient information for a judge to issue an
arrest warrant. Yet under this procedure, the provisional arrest standards do
not meet those required by Title 18, Sec. 3184, namely, "probable cause,"
because Sec. 3184 refers to extradition proceedings and there is no legislation
covering provisional arrest.
While the purpose of provisional arrest is to prevent the flight of the
offender, it is questionable whether a TELEX can be accepted as evidence on
which a warrant may be issued. Legislation is probably needed to clarify
provisional arrest procedures.
In addition, there is no adequate regulation in the existing legislation on
questions of bail during the period of provisional arrest and during extradition proceedings. Presumably, to serve the purpose of preventing the flight of
the accused, no bail should be set, but that violates constitutional rights,
particularly if the relator is a U.S. citizen. Existing case-law places the
burden on the relator to show that he has "special circumstances" warranting
bail.
Another problem is that of the "political offense exception." Legislative
criteria should be set forth determining what the "political offense exception"
is, excluding therefrom international crimes. This would be consonant with
U.S. obligations under international conventions and with the maxim aut
dedere aut judicare. Legislative criteria would help resolve many of the
problems now faced in practice and avoid jurisprudential confusion and
inconsistencies. Because of the difficulties inherent in the now cumbersome
and lengthy practice of extradition, other alternative methods have been
developed some of which are illegal, such as abduction, while others derive

from the use and abuse of immigration laws such as deportation or expulsion.
There are two ways of making extradition a more effective method of
rendition. The first is to make extradition procedures more simple. The
second is to develop an alternative U.S. jurisdictional basis, at least for
international crimes. This second alternative would be significant in that the
United States could prosecute a person, even for crimes not committed in the
United States, instead of extraditing him or her.
The Department of Justice's current investigation of war crimes and of
persons accused of committing crimes against humanity for the purposes of
deportation and denaturalization is presently the only alternative to bring
such persons to justice somewhere in the world, presumably before the Courts
of a state willing to do so because they cannot be prosecuted in the United
States (the crime not having been committed in the United States). Furthermore there is no specific rule in extradition for exclusion of such offenses
from the "political offense exception" in case an extradition request is
received. The present practice, however, in addition to being lengthy and
cumbersome presents some moral dilemmas.
Take the case of a 70-year-old man who allegedly has committed war
crimes or crimes against humanity. The only alternative is deportation or
denaturalization as the case may be (but only if he lied about his past,
otherwise not), even though that individual would be returned to a state that
could execute him. This poses a very serious problem. While the United
States would like to uphold the principle of accountability and responsibility,
it might not necessarily approve of the type of punishment that the deported
or expelled individual would receive in the country to which he would be sent.
The United States thus faces a dilemma. The solution would be to prosecute
such an individual in the United States for those international crimes.
A positive development in resolving some of the extradition problems has
been the treaties and legislation in the United States providing for prisoner
exchange between the United States and other countries. This was originally
devised as a mechanism to bring back to the United States nationals
imprisoned abroad. It also provides a way to get around the nonextradition of
nationals, as long as reciprocity exists, since it would permit them to be
sentenced in the country where they committed the offense, and then
returned to serve their sentences in their country of origin. Certainly this
would ease judicial problems in applying the "rule of noninquiry" since
courts would know that the offender would be returned to the United States
after his trial abroad to serve his sentence.
Still anothei, positive development is the present initiative of the Office of
International Affairs of the United States Department of Justice in proposing
new Draft Legislation on extradition and also to expand it to provide for an
appeal process on the part of the Government acting on behalf of a requesting
state, either on the basis of an interlocutory appeal or an appeal from a
decision of the magistrate denying extradition. The Relator's recourse should
no longer be by way of habeas corpus but by appeal. But existing legislation
should also be amended to cover provisional arrest, bail, and outline the
standards for the "political offense exception". In addition Senate Bill 1437,
should be amended to establish a jurisdictional basis for the prosecution in
the United States of those persons whom the United States does not wish to
extradite.

This approach would fulfill the precept of aut dedere autjudicare which is
now the basis of a new European Convention on the "European Judicial
Space and Cooperation in Penal Matters". This formula would help eliminate
many of the legal and human problems judges now face in decisions to
extradite, and it would lessen the need to resort to other legal and extra-legal
devices as alternatives to extradition.
Extradition is probably the most significant instrument of international
cooperation in criminal law and it is important to retain in that practice
those standards of international human rights protection of which the
presumption of innocence and its legal consequences are not the least.
Extradition law and practice can be made more effective and satisfy the need
for speedy judicial determination without curtailing basic human rights. To
accomplish these goals requires a minimum of legislative imagination and
the United States is now in a propitious position to do just that, as it is in the
process of reenacting its federal criminal laws.

REMARKS OF WILLIAM

S.

KENNEY*

Before discussing specific problems encountered in extradition I will
identify and review some of the general principles of extradition under U.S.
law.
Extradition by the United States to foreign countries is exclusively a
prerogative of the federal government which may be exercised only when
specifically authorized by statute or treaty.' The present law 2 authorizes
extradition only when there is a treaty of extradition with the requesting
state., There is no statutory prohibition against the United States requesting
the extradition of a fugitive from a country with which we do not have an
extradition treaty. Many countries condition their willingness to extradite
without a treaty upon being given assurances of reciprocity.4 Since the
United States cannot give such assurances it does not ordinarily make request for extradition absent a treaty. However, there have been some rare
instances in which the United States has obtained the extradition of a
fugitive, even though it was unable to give assurances of reciprocity.
The Secretary of State has the responsibility and authority to extradite a
person found extraditable by the extradition magistrate.5 It must be noted
that the extradition laws do not require the Secretary of State to surrender
such a fugitive. They provide only that the Secretary may surrender the
fugitive.6 The Secretary of State may impose conditions on the surrender.

*Senior Adviser, Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of
Justice. Mr. Kenney spoke in his personal capacity. The views expressed are his and do not
necessarily represent those of the Department of Justice.
'Valentine v. U.S. ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9, 18 (1936).
'18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184-3186, 3188-3195.
'18 U.S.C. § 3181.
'E.g., Germany, Argentina, Austria, Belgium and Japan. See 1. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW(1971) at 31-32.
$18 U.S.C. § 3186.
11d.
IM. WHITE'MAN DIGESr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 1051-53.

The surrender is for the limited purpose that the fugitive be tried for the
offense charged."
A problem encountered in extradition is the inadequate extradition law. It
does not detail the procedures to be observed. This lack of procedural
standards is exacerbated by the fact that the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,' the Federal Rules of Evidencelo and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure" are not applicable to extradition. There are no provisions governing provisional arrest;' 2 waiver of extradition; the giving of consent to
reextradition to a third country or to the trial of a fugitive for an offense other
than that for which extradition was granted; or for temporary extradition.
The law authorizes the issuance of a warrant for the ari est of a fugitive on the
3
basis of a complaint under oath by any individual.
A problem arises in locating the applicable treaty and determining
whether it is in force. Treaties in Force'4 includes a reference to the United
States extradition treaties under each country and an alphabetical list of the
treaties appears in a note to 18 U.S.C.A. 3181.15 However, questions arise as
to whether a treaty listed in one or both of these publications has been
modified or abrogated by the domestic law of the country involved. For
example, the Irish Extradition Act of 1965 provides that any order made
under section 2 of the Extradition Act of 1870, and in force immediately
before the commencement of the Act shall continue in force and be deemed an
order made under the new Act. The 1965 Act further provides that any such
order, if not sooner revoked, expired on January 1, 1972. Since under Irish
law there must be an order in force for an extradition arrangement to be in
effect, these provisions resulted in the expiration, as of January 1, 1972, of
extradition treaties which predated the effective date of the 1965 Act.'
Difficult problems also arise when there has been a succession of states, as
for example, whether the 1931 extradition treaty between the United States
and the United Kingdom 7 is in force for a particular former British colony.
Another problem in relation to the extradition treaties is whether they or
all of their provisions are self-executing. If the treaty provides that the
United States will or will not extradite for certain offenses, then the treaty
would be self-executing. However, if the treaty specifies procedures to be
followed by the United States courts it is not clear that such a provision is
self-executing.

'18 U.S.C. § 3186.
'Rule 54.
"°Rule 1101 (d).
" Rule 1. The rules govern all suits of a civil nature hence are not applicable to extradition.
"18 U.S.C. § 3187 relates to provisional arrest and detention within the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the United States for extradition to a foreign country.
"18 U.S.C. § 3184.
'-The U.S. Dept. of State, TREATIES IN FORCE, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,

published annually.
"West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1969, kept current by annual pocket parts.
'TREATIES IN FORCE, January 1, 1979 lists four Conventions between the United States and

the United Kingdom applicable to Ireland as being in force.
"47 Stat. 2122.

A problem arises in determining whether a particular offense is an
extraditable offense since the United States does not have a uniform
definition of an "extraditable offense" in the statutes or in the treaties. The8
U.S. extradition treaties enumerate the offenses which are extraditable.
The Model Extradition Treaty9 lists 39 offenses; the recent treaty with
Japan,20 about 140; the statute 2' authorizing extradition from the United
States to a foreign country occupied by or under the control of the United
States, 16. To be extraditable the offense must be included in the list of
offenses. In addition the act must be a crime in the requesting state and also
the requested state. Because of the federal system in the United States
problems have arisen in the choice of law to be used in determining double
criminality. In Brauch v.Raiche, 618 F. 2d 843 (C.A. 1, 1980) the court found
that the substantive law of the asylum state (New Hampshire) should be used
to determine double criminality even though it might not represent the law
of the preponderance of the states. The "check charges" and the "forgery
charges" were found to satisfy the requirement but the court found that the
"currency charges" were not crimes under the law of England or under the
comparable New Hampshire statute.
The "political offense" exclusion from extradition causes many problems.
First, who should make the decision that an offense is a political offense, and
second, is the offense a political offense? In the first instance the decision is
made by the extradition magistrate. If the magistrate finds that the offense is
not a political offense and that the fugitive is extraditable the matter goes to
the Secretary of State for decision. On the other hand if the magistrate finds
that the offense is a political offense the decision is final and not appe._.able.
A "political offense" is not defined in U.S. extradition law or treaties. Tests
have been developed by the courts to make this determination. 22 They may be
summarized as requiring that the crime must have occurred during an
uprising and the accused must have been a member of the group participating in the uprising and must have acted to further the political end. I believe
that a brief review of some extradition cases involving the "political offense"
exception would be of interest.
England requested the extradition of Peter Gabriel John McMullen3 from

the United States for the bombing of a military barracks in England. The
evidence established that McMullen at the time of the offense was a member
of the Provisional Irish Republican Army; that the PIRA was engaged in
terroristic activities in Northern Ireland and elsewhere seeking to cause the
British to leave Northern Ireland; and that McMullen acted in furtherance of
the cause of the PIRA. The extradition magistrate found that the crime was a
"political offense" and dismissed the extradition proceedings.

"An exception is the Multilateral Montevideo Convention on Extradition. 49 Stat. 3111. This
Convention is operative only when there is not a bilateral treaty of extradition in force between

the parties.
"DIGEsr OF U.S. PRACrICE

IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1976) 132-37.

2T.I.A.S. 9625.
1'18 U.S.C. § 3185.
"The English rule of Re Castione [1891] 1 Q.B. 149 is followed in the United States. Karadzole
v. Artukovic, 247 F. 2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957),judgment vacated and case remanded for further
proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3184, 355 U.S. 393 (1958).
"See Evans, JudicialDecisions, 74 A. J. I. L. 434.

The United States requested the extradition from England of Morrison
Budlong and Jane Kember for burglaries. The evidence before the magistrate
revealed the following facts. Members of the Church of Scientology unlawfully as trespassers entered various offices of the Internal Revenue Service
and of the Department of Justice. They used government property and made
photocopies of the contents of confidential government files relating to the
affairs of the Church of Scientology and its adherents. They replaced the
original documents in the files but stole the photocopies. The actual burglars
were caught red-handed and they then revealed that they were acting on
written instructions of Budlong and Kember, senior members of the hierarchy of the Church of Scientology. The extradition magistrate issued warrants
committing Budlong and Kember to prison to await extradition. They moved
for writs of habeas corpus on the grounds that the extradition warrants were
unlawful because among other reasons the offenses were of a political
character. The Queen's Bench Division, High Court of Justice rejected this
contention.24 Mr. Justice Griffiths noted "In respect of any Government
policy there will probably be a substantial number of people who disagree
with it and would wish to change it, but it should not be thought that if they
commit a crime to achieve their ends it necessarily becomes an offense of a
political character." He accepted the idea underlying an "offense of a political
character" expressed by Lord Radcliffe in Schtraks v. Government of Israel25
that the fugitive be at odds with the requesting state on some issues
connected with the political control or government of the country and that
"political" in the context of a political offense is analogous with "political" in
such phrases as "political refugee", "political asylum" or "political prisoner."
Justice Griffiths found that the applicants did not order the burglaries in
order t, challenge the political control or government of the United States
but did so to further the interests of the Church of Scientology and its
members, and in particular of L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of Scientology.
The Lnited States requested the extradition from France of William
Holder and Katherine Mary Kercow for aircraft hijacking. On April 14, 1975
the chambre d'accusation of the Cour d'appel of Paris found that the crimes
were of a political character and rejected the extradition request. This action
was severely criticized by the United States.26 It appeared from the decision
that any offense committed with a subjective political motive would be
deemed a political offense and therefore nonextraditable. However, on
October 17, 1979 the same chambre d'accusation gave its advice on the
request of the Italian government for the extradition of Francesco Piperno
which indicates that this is not the rule. The extradition of Piperno was
requested for the kidnaping and first degree murder of Aldo Moro and for
other crimes. The court rejected the request for extradition for the other
crimes some on the ground that they were not covered by the Franco-Italian
Extradition Convention, others on the ground that the evidence of culpability
was insufficient. The court found that the kidnaping and murder of Moro
were in no way political in nature. It reached this conclusion on the ground
that these ordinary crimes were so heinous that they could not be considered

-Not yet reported. Copy furnished by the British Embassy,
A.C. 556, 591.
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political offenses. The court noted that Article 5 (2)(2) of the extradition act"
permits extradition for heinous acts of barbarity committed during an
insurrection or civil war and therefore justification of such crimes for
political reasons should, be precluded even more when the legal institutions
of the requesting country are operating fully and normally. The court gave its
advice that Piperno was extraditable.
I have mentioned only some of the problems of extradition but they
indicate the need for an adequate extradition law. Changes in the present
law were contained in S. 1437, the proposed new Federal Criminal Code,
which passed the Senate and are contained in its successor S.1722 presently
pending in the Senate. The negotiation of new treaties, developments in the
case law, and research conducted since the changes were first proposed
dictate that the provisions of S. 1722 dealing with extradition should be
modified and expanded. It is contemplated that a new chapter on extradition
will be submitted to Congress. I hope that consideration will be given to
authorizing extradition without a treaty, to defining an extraditable offense,
to including detailed procedural provisions, and to specifying the conditions
under which extradition may be granted.
I also hope that in negotiating extradition treaties we will seek, where
possible, to abandon totally the practice of enumerating the extraditable
offenses as has been done with reference to federal crimes in recent treaties.
Consideration should also be given to participating in the negotiation of
multilateral treaties such as the proposed Inter-American Convention on
Extradition.
REMARKS BY CHARLES GORDON-

Contrary to the views already presented, at present U.S. exclusion and
deportation laws are not satisfactory for the purposes of extradition. U.S.
immigration laws fail to answer questions about the length of time necessary
to complete the immigration process, leaving undetermined the administrative and judicial mechanisms of that process, and questions about limitations
of the statutory grounds for exclusion and deportation.
Under the law, immigration officers can stop and question at the border
any person seeking to enter the United States. Yet immigration officers may
not know whether a person is wanted by some law enforcement agency. Also,
the immigration officer's authority is limited; he has no authority to return
an alien to a country in which he has been charged with a crime. The only
such authority the immigration officer has is in connection with his duty to
bar aliens who have been convicted of crimes or who admit involvement in
crimes involving moral turpitude.
The immigration authority may become aware that a person is wanted,
through comparison with its "lookout books," a set of books kept at each port
of entry listing information on fugitive offenders. If a person is determined to
be clearly unentitled to enter the United States, immigration officials may
detain him and notify the authorities that are looking for him. Yet this is the
extent to which there are immigration procedures for returning offenders to
their own countries. Once he becomes involved in the immigration process,
"Law of March 10, 1927 relative to the extradition of aliens (J.O. March 11, 1927).
*Of the District of Columbia Bar; formerly General Counsel, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

however, the alien is entitled to a hearing, which includes the right to
counsel, to an administrative appeal, to a decision on the record, to present
evidence, and to go to the courts for judicial review after receiving a decision
at the hearing. Hearings do not readily lead to extradition, since they tend to
be the start of a long appeal process. If a government were to seek to have a
fugitive returned and if there were grounds in the immigration statute for
returning him, which there usually are not, it would still be a long time
before that government would have access to the fugitive.
The deportation process is not relevant for purposes of extradition because
extradition in itself is not a ground for deportation. Unless there has been a
conviction for a criminal offense, there is no statutory basis for deportation.
Furthermore, a person considered deportable is entitled to full due process
under the law, which includes notice of charges, an opportunity to answer
those charges, to have a full and fair hearing on the record, to be represented
by counsel, and so on. At the end of a deportation proceeding, the judge may
grant voluntary departure, letting the person go where he pleases. This is in
fact customary in almost every case; the deportation statute itself says that
the first step is to permit the person to select the place to which he is to be
deported. Of course, he will not select the country that wants to prosecute
him.
In deportation proceedings, U.S. practice has been to give the right of
asylum to a person who claims he would be persecuted in his home country.
This has been formalized in the new Refugee Act of March 17, 1980. Again,
there arises the problem of dilatory procedure under which the Department
of State's views are requested, and because the Department is always
reluctant to express its views, the process drags on. Thus, if the United States
has a person who claims that he has been persecuted, who has designated
another country to which he wants to be deported, and who is likely to be
given the right to go there, it is apparent that deportation becomes a very
ineffective and undesirable means for returning a fugitive to a requesting
country.
The problems involved in using the deportation process as a means of
extradition are illustrated in a number of cases, of which the case of Marcos
Perez Jimenez, the ex-dictator of Venezuela, is one. Venezuela contacted the
Department of Justice, and the Department started deportation and extradition proceedings. Extradition went gradually forward one way, while deportation went gradually forward another way: finally, the extradition process
was completed. The Secretary of State was about to approve extradition,
when Perez Jimenez raised the argument that first the deportation process
had to be completed in the Board of Immigration Appeals, and asked to apply
for political asylum. The Board vacated the deportation proceeding, however,
and Perez Jimenez was deported to Venezuela.
Hermine Braunsteiner Ryan was a notorious guard in a Nazi prison camp
who married a U.S. citizen, established residence in the United States, and
was naturalized. When Mrs. Ryan's original identity was discovered, she was
reported to the Department of Justice, which initiated deportation proceedings. Up to that point, no one in Europe had begun prosecution of Mrs. Ryan,
and because she had become an American citizen, denaturalization proceedings first had to be brought.
Mrs. Ryan's counsel conceded denaturalization at the proceedings, which
was to her detriment, because the entire procedure of hearings and appeals

would have taken years before she could have been denaturalized and
deported. The Department of Justice approached the Federal Republic of
Germany and Poland, inquiring if their respective governments wished to
charge Mrs. Ryan with a crime so that extradition proceedings could be
started. The FRG brought the extradition proceedings, and the deportation
proceedings were terminated; Mrs. Ryan was extradited to the FRG. This is
an example of the fact that extradition proceedings are generally much more
effective than deportation proceedings.
In another case, an officer of the Syrian Army disappeared from his country
with a bundle of cash, and the Syrian government requested the United
States to extradite him. Because there was no U.S.-Syrian extradition treaty,
however, Syria had to rely on the deportation process. He was apprehended
and denied bail pending the deportation proceeding. He appealed his detention to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which on the basis of confidential
information supplied by the Syrian government affirmed his detention and
the denial of bail. The District Court and the Court of Appeals also affirmed
the original decision to detain the Syrian and to deny him bail. This process
went on and on without result, ending finally when he married a U.S. citizen
and became a permanent resident of the United States.
The Yugoslav government started extradition proceedings against a U.S.
citizen of some 30 years, for war crimes. A U.S. Commissioner terminated the
extradition process when he found that the citizen was wanted for political
crimes. However, with the present outcry against former Nazis the U.S.
Government is itself starting deportation proceedings against him.
Yet another case is that of a fugitive from the Romanian government
charged with the murder of a large number of Jewish people while he was
leader of the Iron Guard. He sneaked into the United States 20 years ago and
became naturalized. Denaturalization proceedings were started seven years
ago, but he still has not come to trial.
In conclusion, the immigration and deportation process contains important
procedures for the individual, such as the protections of due process, of a fair
hearing, of fair play, of access to courts, and of the expectation of a legal,
measured, and reasonable determination. Because of this constitutional
protection, it appears that the U.S. deportation process will not satisfy the
needs of foreign governments who wish to have fugitives speedily extradited.
Moreover, while conviction is a ground for exclusion, U.S. courts do not
recognize conviction in absentia. The conviction must be one arrived at
through established principles of due process.
REMARKS OF SHARON

A.

WILLIAMS*

One of the most frequently used methods of illegal rendition is unlawful
arrest. This raises the question of whether such methods of rendering a
fugitive from justice impair the jurisdiction of the court over his subsequent
trial. In the absence of general universal criminal jurisdiction it is well
established that only the state whose criminal law has been violated can try
the person of the accused. However, if the accused seeks refuge abroad he
must obviously be brought to the state in which he will stand trial.
Will the accused be able to resist successfully any attempt to prosecute him
*Osgoode Hall Law School, York University

on the basis that his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
has been illegally obtained? Kidnaping involves the violation of conventions
as well as customary international law whether it is by officials of the
prosecuting state, or by persons who perpetrate the kidnaping at their
instigation. Kidnaping is a violation of the territorial integrity of the state of
refuge, and also, on the occasion where an extradition treaty exists, can also
be seen as a breach of the agreed-to extradition method.
Can the individual himself use unlawful arrest as a bar to the jurisdiction
of the court? The usual approach in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
United States in such a case is not to excuse the offender. This practice has its
source in the Roman law concept of male captus bene detentus which is the
basis for the proposition that the courts, once in the possession of the body of
the accused, have jurisdiction, and that due process is not lacking so long as
the person is given a fair trial.
The broader questions within the realm of unlawful apprehension relate to
the interest of the individual vis-A-vis those of the states. The offensiveness
of the illegal arrest must be weighed against that of the alleged crime. Both
Canadian and U.S. courts have tended to promote the idea that illegality in
relation to pretrial events should not preclude detention. However, it can be
argued that the government itself should obey the law, even where criminals
are concerned, since there is a social interest in the government setting a
good example to its citizens. Buttressing this argument is the fact that the
human rights enumerated in several treaties, notably the U.N. Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,' include a right to be protected from abduction.
However, these rights are often violated, indicating a misplaced sense of
justice on the part of many law enforcement officials.
In the cases up to Toscanino 2 Canadian courts have rigidly adopted U.S.
and United Kingdom approaches establishing that illegal arrest doesn't
affect the competence of the judge or the jurisdiction of the court. A number of
cases in Canada have followed the famous case of Ker v. Illinois and have also
followed older English cases such as Ex ParteSusanna Scott. 3 In all of these,

the courts affirmed that in cases of unlawful seizure the only remedy
accorded is one to the government from which a person has been seized.
The more recent case involving un lawful seizure is Toscanino, in which the
U.S. Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit was seen to adopt a different
attitude than in the previous cases where it had adhered to the Ker-Frisbie
rule. The court held that the requirement of due process as it was understood
in the United States required the court to divest itself ofjurisdiction over the
accused where that jurisdiction was acquired as a result of illegal conduct on
the part of law enforcement authorities.
Toscanino had claimed that he had been subjected to torture while being
interrogated by Los Angeles County, California authorities, and the Court of
Appeals responded that it would consider his claims as evidence if he could
prove them. Yet while Toscanino showed that he was interrogated roughly,
he could not show that his rights were violated. The motion to dismiss the
indictment on jurisdictional grounds was dismissed by the District Court for

'See The U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 9 (1) (5).
2
U. S. v. Toscanino, 500 F. 2d 26 (2nd Cir.). Rehearing denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 2175.
9 B & C 446 (1829), 9 B & C 446, 109 E. R. 166.

